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This paper proposes a methodology that explores the tradeoff between increasing component reliability
and utilizing component redundancy as the strategy to meet space transportation reliability requirements.
This technique would be employed by design engineers to make decisions about a reliability approach. The
tradeoff between component redundancy and making parts more reliable warrants more investigation. Sys-
tem level reliability decisions are being made without a thorough exploration of cost saving opportunities.
The impact of using redundancy on a system, including how it affects metrics such as development and
operations cost, is presented. Additionally, there is little understood about the resources required to im-
prove component reliability to acceptable levels. The process of making parts more reliable is studied and
quantified. To incorporate the uncertainty that exists from reliability applications, a stochastic approach
is used. Case studies of historical space systems are presented to demonstrate how this methodology is
applicable. The findings show how a different reliability approach may have resulted in significant cost
reductions. Conclusions are drawn about how to best meet reliability requirements while remaining within
strict budgetary guidelines.
1 Introduction
In human space transportation, component redun-
dancy has been relied upon to satisfy reliability
requirements. Component redundancy does have
some drawbacks because this reliability strategy
adds complexity and additional parts. Little work
has been completed to show the life cycle cost im-
pacts of adding redundancy. In other words, if the
parts count were reduced by increasing component
reliability, how would the life cycle cost change?
This paper will begin to address that tradeoff with
by combining reliability models with a model for
determining the cost of reliability upgrades.
Quantifying the cost of upgrading component reli-
ability is a difficult task in the face of uncertainty.
Several models have been proposed and this pa-
per will use one of them [1]. Monte Carlo Sim-
ulation (MCS) will also be included to lessen the
importance of some of the assumptions that are
required. MCS will show the sensitivity of the as-
sumptions in the model used for determining the
cost of upgrading component reliability. Results
will be presented for two human rated space trans-
portation vehicles: the Space Transportation Sys-
tem (STS) and the Apollo Command and Service
Module (CSM). These results will discuss the cost
of upgrading a subsystem and whether the life cy-
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cle cost of the overall program would have justified
an increase in development cost. The development
cost is the cost associated with the design, develop-
ment, testing and evaluation of the concept through
the first prototype. This cost is also known as the
DDT&E cost. The development cost will be com-
pared with the operations cost for each of the space
transportation vehicles. The operations cost is de-
fined as the cost associated with program imple-
mentation. This cost is both the fixed annual cost
required for supporting mission capability and the
per flight cost expended when an actual mission
is flown. By understanding the impacts of redun-
dancy on the operations cost, a justification can be
made about whether or not increasing component
reliability would worth the development resources
required.
2 Notation
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
CCF Common Cause Failure
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle
CSM Command and Service Module
DDT&E Design, Development, Testing and
Evaluation
LCC Life-Cycle Cost
MCS Monte Carlo Simulation
MGL Multiple Greek Letter
STS Space Transportation System




Ri Desired Component Reliability
Ri,min Current Component Reliability




High system reliability can be achieved through
multiple methods. A common manner is to use
component redundancy. Using component redun-
dancy has some drawbacks due to common cause
failure and the increase in system complexity. An-
other method for increasing system reliability is to
increase component reliability. Strategies for in-
creasing component reliability include building in
larger design and environmental margins [2]. Dur-
ing manufacturing, high component reliability can
be assured by carefully screening parts once they
are produced. Carefully controlling the manufac-
turing process with tight tolerances will also in-
crease component reliability. These stringent meth-
ods are one reason that increasing component re-
liability is typically associated with higher costs
and development time. Yet, the benefit of us-
ing increased component reliability will be realized
later in the program during the operational phase.
By using lower amounts of components, the time
spent verifying proper operation is decreased [3];
this time will be multiplied many times over for a
reusable system. The verification process includes
all inspections, testing, and processing required be-
fore a mission can begin. Lower numbers of compo-
nents can also benefit performance by weighing less
and using less volume when compared with relying
on component redundancy. Quantifying the cost of
increasing component reliability is a difficult prob-
lem with a lot of investigation still required. This
paper will use an exponential model to determine
the cost of increasing component reliability. MCS
will be utilized to study the sensitivity of the main
assumption made in this model.
The exponential model that is employed for deter-
mining the cost of increasing component reliability
is taken from the reliability community [1]. The
model was proposed as a general function with in-
tuitive characteristics. Equation (1) is the formu-






The result of this formula is a dimensionless num-
ber that represents the cost of increasing compo-
nent reliability. Ri is the desired reliability of the
component. Ri,min is the current reliability of the
component and Ri,max is the maximum achievable
reliability of the component [1]. Ri,max is assumed
to be 99.99999% for all calculations in this paper.
F is the feasibility number, which will be discussed
later.
This model was chosen because it exhibits a num-
ber of good characteristics. First, the cost is always
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increasing as the reliability increases. There are no
dips in the cost formulation with the monotonic
function [1]. With this formula, the cost of achiev-
ing high reliability is large. This represents the
difficulty in creating high reliability hardware. Fi-
nally, the exponential function makes it harder for
a component to increase its reliability from 95%
to 99% than from 70% to 75%. Other functions
would not represent the difficulty of increasing the
reliability of a high reliability component as well
as this exponential function. This function must
be mapped to actual cost values before it can be-
come useful in understanding the tradeoff between
increasing component redundancy and increasing
component redundancy.
The cost function will be mapped using available
hardware data. There are very limited instances in
space flight history where reliability increases were
planned and a development number was calculated.
Other instances such as the evolution of a subsys-
tem between programs will also have to be used to
determine how the dimensionless cost function cor-
relates to an actual development cost value. These
cost correlations will be kept separate between sub-
systems because the subsystems perform very dif-
ferent functions. Another reason to keep the cost
correlations separate is because the subsystems are
at various technology levels and receive different
amounts of resources. The use of MCS will help to
understand the possible range of costs required to
increase component reliability. MCS will mitigate
the lack of available data and show the sensitivity
of the initial assumptions. The biggest assumption
in this model is the feasibility value.
The feasibility estimate is an assumption that is
used to reflect the difficulty in increasing compo-
nent reliability. A lower value, such as 0.1, will
increase the cost result compared to using a higher
value, such as 0.9. In this paper, a number was
assumed with MCS wrapped around the feasibil-
ity value. The MCS shows the sensitivity of this
assumption and will eventually lead to a range of
cost values for increasing the component reliability.
[1] does mention correlating the feasibility value
with component characteristics, such as the cur-
rent state of the art, the past history of reliability
increases, and future technology growth, but the
lack of data made this correlation difficult. More
discussion about this feasibility value occurs later
in the paper.
Using component redundancy can be an effective
means for meeting system reliability requirements.
On the STS-9 mission, two general purpose com-
puters failed [4]; however, since the STS carries five
general purpose computers, the orbiter was able to
land. Additionally, landing occurred with two out
of three auxiliary power units (APUs) on fire [4].
While the fire occurred shortly before landing, the
final mission phase would have been much more
difficult if the orbiter did not have a triple redun-
dant APU system. However, using component re-
dundancy does have its drawbacks. As mentioned
earlier, increased component redundancy will add
complexity and parts count. One of the main short-
falls of the STS is the large number of parts due to
the use of dual and triple redundant systems [5].
The processing time is doubled or tripled for cer-
tain subsystems because each string of components
must be verified for proper operation. Much of this
time could have been reduced if the component reli-
ability was higher. Finally, Common Cause Failure
(CCF) can bypass any use of component redun-
dancy.
All models using component redundancy must con-
sider CCF. CCF is a failure mode inherent in all
components of the same type. An example of
CCF could be a manufacturing defect found in
all components produced from the same assembly
plant. With space hardware produced in such lit-
tle amounts, CCF is very prevalent and must be
considered. CCF is included in all reliability mod-
els within this paper. The multiple Greek letter
model (MGL) [6] is used to account for CCF in the
reliability calculations. In this model, the β (Beta)
value is 0.1 and the γ (Gamma) value is 0.75. The
β value is the percentage of all failures of the first
component that are inherent in the second compo-
nent. The γ value is the percentage of failures in
the first two components that are inherent in the
third component. Therefore, if the first two com-
ponents fail, there is a 75% chance that the third
component will also fail due to CCF. These num-
bers are referenced from various STS problem re-
port databases along with the historical experience
of leading NASA reliability experts [7]. When CCF
is accounted for, the benefits of increasing beyond
dual redundancy are very small. Even the benefits
of dual redundancy are mitigated quite a bit when
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CCF is included. Therefore, the tradeoff between
using component redundancy and increasing com-
ponent reliability should be considered by design
engineers.
4 Problem Statement
The tradeoff between component reliability and in-
creased redundancy will focus on two subsystems
from two different human space flight eras. The
first problem reveals the tradeoff between increas-
ing the reliability of the previously mentioned APU
and using the triple redundancy strategy employed
by NASA in their final design of the STS. The sec-
ond problem discusses the redundancy versus reli-
ability tradeoff by highlighting the landing system
of both the Gemini and Apollo capsules. These
two cases were picked because they both use re-
dundancy but the hardware are built for different
lifetimes. The STS is a reusable spacecraft while
the Gemini and Apollo capsules were meant for
single missions. With NASA about to finalize the
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) design, the relia-
bility strategy may be influenced by the reusability
of the vehicle.
In the first problem, the STS APU system is stud-
ied. The APU system consists of the three sepa-
rate, but identical APUs, hydraulic pumps and hy-
draulic systems [8]. The APUs create mechanical
shaft power to drive the hydraulic pumps that gen-
erate the pressure required by the hydraulic system.
Each APU is a hydrazine fueled component that
creates mechanical power through the catalytic ac-
tion of its fuel. The hydraulic system provides
pressure for the hydraulic actuators that drive the
thrust vector control of the Space Shuttle Main En-
gines (SSMEs), retract the umibilicals connecting
the External Tank (ET) to the orbiter, and control
the aerosurfaces of the orbiter along with landing
gear. An illustration of the APU is shown in Fig-
ure 1.
A reliability model was created of the whole APU
system based upon the work of the STS PRA [9].
While the PRA examined the contribution to loss
of vehicle by specific subsystems, the estimates will
be used as a most conservative value for reliabil-
ity. Another reason for utilizing the PRA value is
due to the overall lack of reliability data. A single
Figure 1: APU Diagram.
Figure 2: APU Reliability Model.
APU is approximately 98.8% reliable as determined
from the STS PRA. According to the shuttle ref-
erence documents, this system is triple redundant
and can function on only one APU system in emer-
gencies (as evidenced by STS-9 example). An up-
grade was planned for the APU to switch to the
Electric Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) for the fis-
cal year 2001 [10]. With the upgrade, the total
APU system would be, at a minimum, 99.99% re-
liable [11]. Using this system estimate along with
CCF analysis, a single, upgraded APU was calcu-
lated to be 99.9% reliable. Both estimates account
for a single, complete APU system, including the
hydraulic pump and distribution. A model of the
triple redundant APU system is shown below in
Figure 2. As mentioned earlier, CCF is also in-
cluded using the MGL model with the above as-
sumptions.
The cost model from Equation (1) was used to cal-
culate the cost of the reliability upgrade. The de-
velopment cost of the upgrade was estimated at
$241 M FY ’06 [10]. The original estimate was
$224 M FY ’01 but the new value was calculated
using an inflation calculator [12]. While this devel-
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opment is not solely focused on upgrading reliabil-
ity, the assumption is made that to achieve such
high system reliability the full development cost is
required. Additionally, by using this value as the
cost of the reliability upgrade, consistency will be
maintained by always using the most conservative
values. The non-dimensional result from Equation
1 is mapped to the actual cost values by using a
linear relationship.
The final portion of the APU problem is to cal-
culate the cost of upgrading the APU system fur-
ther so that a single APU system can achieve the
reliability of the triple redundant system. An as-
sumption is made about the feasibility value; it is
assumed to be 20% more difficult to move from a
triple redundant system to a single APU system
with increased reliability. The feasibility values are
used with a MCS to calculate a range of cost values.
Therefore, the cost sensitivity to this assumption is
explored and the importance of this assumption is
decreased.
Once the development cost increases are deter-
mined, they can be compared with the operations
cost for processing the APU. The lifetime opera-
tions cost is calculated using the cost of life-cycle
cost (LCC) of the STS program and its develop-
ment cost. Then an operations cost per flight is
determined and the APU processing costs are ex-
amined. A break-even point is determined where
the cost of the reliability upgrade would have been
more valuable than using a triple redundant sys-
tem. An assumption is made that the development
would occur at the start of the STS program and
the savings would occur over 115 flights. The fi-
nal comparison is between the predicted savings on
the operations cost over the life of the STS with the
additional development cost of the upgraded APU.
The second problem examines the cost of changing
the CSM landing system from three parachutes to a
single parachute. The CSM required a drogue and
two of the three main parachutes to operate before
failure [13]. The landing system also would have
worked if only two of the three main parachutes
operated (i.e. the drogue parachute failed). The
Apollo engineers did change the main parachute
reliability value for the second scenario since the
parachutes would be required to operate at a higher
dynamic pressure. In this problem it is acknowl-
edged that size considerations for moving to a sin-
gle parachute were not considered.
To formulate the cost equation, the upgrade from
the Gemini capsule to the Apollo CSM was stud-
ied. For the Gemini capsule, only a single drogue
and main parachute were required for the landing
system [14]. The initial reliability for the Gemini
landing system was estimated at 98.5% [15]. The
Apollo landing system was estimated at 99.69% re-
liability by creating a model incorporating CCF
along with the appropriate two out of three voting
gates. The model is too large for inclusion within
this paper, but interested parties can contact the
author directly for more information. A single main
parachute was estimated by the Apollo engineers
at 99% [13]. Therefore, to match the landing sys-
tem reliability with only one main parachute, the
parachute must increase its reliability to 99.84%,
while holding the drogue parachute reliability con-
stant at 99.85
The cost of the upgrade is determined by using the
development cost of the Apollo CSM landing sys-
tem. The acknowledgement is made that the CSM
landing system most likely deployed at higher ve-
locities due to its higher energy entry from the
moon. Therefore, only 50% of the CSM devel-
opment cost was considered to calibrate the non-
dimensional cost equation to an actual develop-
ment cost. While the parachute deployment ve-
locities are most likely not too different between
Apollo and Gemini, a 50% value will continue to
err on the conservative side. Using this mapping,
a cost is calculated to change from a two out of
three main parachute system to a single parachute.
The same assumption is made about the feasibility
value; the difficulty is increased by 20% to move
from the lower component reliability system to one
with higher component reliability. Also, MCS is
used to again explore the sensitivity of the feasibil-
ity assumption.
5 Results
The calculation of the cost of increasing APU com-
ponent reliability is listed in Table 1. The cost is a
non-dimensional cost number that is mapped to an
actual development cost. Using the published es-
timates for the initial reliability upgrade, the non-
dimensionless cost can be calibrated. The cost of
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Table 1: APU Reliability Upgrade Results.
Upgrade Ri,min f Ri DDT&E FY ’06
APU to EAPU 0.988 0.9 0.999 241 $M
APU Upgrade 0.999 0.7 0.9999 1194 $M
Table 2: APU MCS Upgrade Results Range.
Cost Range: $M FY ’06
Minimum Mean Maximum
480 1243 3054
the upgrade to a single EAPU system is then esti-
mated and included in Table 1. These estimates re-
lied upon the feasibility assumptions discussed ear-
lier. Therefore, a MCS is used to vary the feasibility
assumption. These assumptions are varied by +/-
5% to understand the cost sensitivity. Table 2 lists
the range of the MCS and Figure 3 shows the result
of the MCS to calculate the cost of upgrading to a
single EAPU.
The reliability upgrade to a single EAPU system
would be very costly. According to this analysis, an
additional $1.2 B FY ’06 would have been required
for only the APU upgrade. Additionally, the MCS
simulation shows that the upgrade could have cost
has much as $3 B FY ’06 for only the APU. This
cost is now compared with the operations cost of
the STS.
Table 3 has a top level breakdown of the STS costs.
Using the mean value of the upgrade, a break even
point is found where the upgrade plus the process-
Figure 3: MCS for EAPU Upgrade.
Table 3: STS Total Program Costs [16].
Cost Category $M FY ’06
Total Program Cost 150000
Total Development 18
Total Operations Cost 149982
Operations Cost/Flight 1304
Figure 4: LCC of APU Processing.
ing cost of a single APU is equivalent to the pro-
cessing costs of three APUs. The break even point
is found as a function of the total APU processing
cost. The break even point is found to be at an
APU processing cost of $16.3 M FY ’06 per flight.
In other words, if total APU processing (i.e. for
all three APUs) has cost more than $16.3 M FY
’06 per flight, then the upgrading to a single APU
at the start of STS development would have been
worthwhile. Figure 4 illustrates the tradeoff as a
function of APU processing cost per flight. The
vertical axis shows the total cost of APU process-
ing, assuming 115 flights.
The next problem was evaluating the potential of
upgrading the reliability of a single main parachute
on the CSM. The results of upgrading the main
parachute are listed in Table 4. Again, the relia-
bility and development cost increase between the
Gemini and CSM programs was used to estimate
the cost of increasing the reliability of a single main
parachute. The same assumptions regarding the
feasibility values were made and another MCS was
run to explore the sensitivity of this assumption.
Table 5 lists the range of cost values while Figure 5
shows the results from the MCS.
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Table 4: Main Parachute Reliability Upgrade Re-
sults.
Upgrade Ri,min f Ri DDT&E FY ’06
Gemini to CSM 0.985 0.9 0.9969 178 $M
Chute Upgrade 0.99 0.7 0.9984 586 $M
Table 5: Main Parachute MCS Upgrade Results
Range.
Cost Range: $M FY ’06
Minimum Mean Maximum
383 591 891
The total operations cost for the time that the
Apollo program was performing missions is esti-
mated at $809 M FY ’06 [16]. With a mean value
of $591 M FY ’06 for upgrading the landing system
from three parachutes to a single parachute, the
value for the upgrade is non-existent. The opera-
tions cost for the Apollo program were lower due
to the number of years Apollo operated (five) and
because it was an expendable system. There was
no processing time required once the vehicle landed
back on Earth. Therefore, reducing the complexity
of the landing system would not have been worth-
while for the Apollo engineers.
Figure 5: MCS for Main Parachute Upgrade.
6 Conclusion & Recommenda-
tions
For the STS upgrade, only one subsystem was se-
lected. By examining more detailed operations cost
data, a subsystem with a higher processing cost
could have been selected for a reliability upgrade.
One example could be the RCS system, which relies
upon hypergolic propellants. Hypergolic propel-
lants require unique handling and greatly increase
the operations cost. If higher reliability jets could
be used, then possibly some of the jets could be
removed to speed up the processing time. Other
redundant systems include the general computers,
and the fuel cells, which all may warrant investi-
gation for a reliability upgrade depending on their
impact on STS processing.
The drawback for the reliability upgrade is that a
much larger development cost would have been re-
quired. When considering budget profiles, the in-
crease in development cost most likely would have
delayed operational capability. However, the de-
crease in operations cost would have made the pro-
gram more sustainable with a higher capability for
launches per year. Overall, the STS has been an
excellent vehicle for space missions, but the lessons
learned regarding less complexity for better opera-
tions cost must be considered for future programs.
The reliability tradeoffs deserve consideration in or-
der to make future programs more sustainable. In
today’s environment of limited budgets, a large pro-
gram such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
must use every cost saving opportunity possible.
Therefore, tradeoffs between more reliable hard-
ware and the use of redundancy should be ex-
amined during the detailed design phase. For a
reusable CEV, a small increase in development
cost could lead to much greater savings in LCC.
With greater savings later in the program, NASA
would have more freedom to support additional
programs for exploration. Additionally, higher reli-
ability components could increase performance by
decreasing the total weight. More usable volume
could also result from limiting the number of com-
ponents through the increase of component relia-
bility. There are enough benefits from using a fault
avoidance strategy as opposed to a fault tolerant
strategy that resources should be devoted to study-
ing this tradeoff for the next vehicle design.
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The methodology in this paper is not without draw-
backs. Assumptions were made about the feasi-
bility value, which has a large affect on the final
cost number. The feasibility value requires a closer
investigation before the methodology can be fully
implemented. As mentioned earlier, the feasibility
value could be linked to specific subsystem charac-
teristics, such as the current state of the art and
future technology growth. Additionally, the relia-
bility values were assumed to be deterministic point
values. For high reliability hardware, the verifica-
tion process becomes much tougher as the lifetime
is increased. Longer tests and development periods
are required to confirm that the hardware will be-
have like its reliability model. However, these are
small challenges to overcome considering the overall
impact that could be realized. The original goal of
the STS was to have aircraft-like operations; mov-
ing towards higher reliability components would
help implement that vision. Future cost savings
are required to make exploration a sustainable pro-
gram and this methodology is one technique that
could be used to help fulfill those reductions.
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